A Deterrence Perspective on Damages for Fraudulent Misrepresentation

Qi Zhou
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Qi Zhou: The School of Law, The University of Manchester. Williamson Building, Oxford Road Manchester, M13 9PL. Email: zhou@qizhou.net

Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics, 2007, vol. 19, issue 1, 83-96

Abstract: The purposes of this paper are twofold. First, it provides a theoretical framework for understanding the deterrence function of damages as a private legal remedy for fraudulent misrepresentation, explains, from an economic perspective, why fraudulent misrepresentation is socially undesirable, and then shows how the damages rule can be used as a deterrence instrument. Second, it conducts a brief analysis of the deterrence of fraudulent misrepresentation in English tort law and argues that, despite some imperfections, damages in tort law can provide a valuable complement to some traditional deterrence sanctions to fraud such as criminal law and regulation.

Date: 2007
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:jinter:v:19:y:2007:i:1:p:83-96

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