Institutional Economics of Cooperation and The Political Economy of Trust

José G. Vargas-Hernández

Paradigm, 2006, vol. 10, issue 2, 1-8

Abstract: The aim of this paper is to analyse the institutional economics of cooperation and the political economy of trust. It has reviewed transaction costs, the principal-agent theory, market power, increasing-returns theory and value creation, strategic management, competitive forces, resource-based theory, organizational knowledge and learning, strategic choice theory and collective efficiency theory. Finally, it has explained the political economy of trust.

Keywords: cooperation; institutional economics; political economy; trust (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:padigm:v:10:y:2006:i:2:p:1-8

DOI: 10.1177/0971890720060202

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