Republicanism and moralised freedom

Lars JK Moen

Politics, Philosophy & Economics, 2023, vol. 22, issue 4, 423-440

Abstract: A moralised conception of freedom is based on a normative theory. Understanding it therefore requires an analysis of this theory. In this paper, I show how republican freedom as non-domination is moralised, and why analysing this concept therefore involves identifying the basic components of the republican theory of justice. One of these components is the non-moralised pure negative conception of freedom as non-interference. Republicans therefore cannot keep insisting that their freedom concept conflicts with, and is superior to, this more basic concept. I demonstrate how we can use pure negative freedom to formulate the republican theory more precisely. This exercise is more fruitful than the common focus on the alleged conflict between the two freedom concepts.

Keywords: conceptual analysis; moralising freedom; pure negative freedom; republican freedom; the value of freedom (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:pophec:v:22:y:2023:i:4:p:423-440

DOI: 10.1177/1470594X231167592

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