The distinctiveness of relational equality

Devon Cass

Politics, Philosophy & Economics, 2025, vol. 24, issue 1, 51-71

Abstract: In recent years, a distinction between two concepts of equality has been much discussed: “distributive†equality involves people having equal amounts of a good such as welfare or resources, and “social†or “relational†equality involves the absence of (certain kinds of) social hierarchy and the presence of (certain kinds of) equal social relations. This contrast is commonly thought to have important implications for our understanding of the relationship between equality and justice. But the nature and significance of the distinction is far from clear. I examine several accounts of this issue and argue none are entirely satisfactory. In turn, I offer an alternative proposal. Relational equality, on my account, involves a concern with each person having an equal “civic status.†I characterize this concern and show it has distinctive and normatively significant positional and temporal aspects.

Keywords: relational equality; social equality; distributive equality; positional goods; complete lives view (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:pophec:v:24:y:2025:i:1:p:51-71

DOI: 10.1177/1470594X241251389

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