On associating (politically) with the unreasonable

Paul Garofalo

Politics, Philosophy & Economics, 2025, vol. 24, issue 3, 193-214

Abstract: Political liberals typically hold that reasonable citizens should not form political associations (e.g., political parties) with unreasonable citizens. This is because unreasonable citizens are unlikely to conform to the duty of civility—the duty to be able, and willing, to use public reasons in their public political deliberations. Here I argue that a general prohibition on political associations with the unreasonable can undermine the fair value of their political liberties. This is because unreasonable citizens can grow up in epistemic environments that make it difficult to be reasonable, and so to direct citizens to not associate with them can deprive citizens from certain social backgrounds the equal opportunity for political influence. I propose instead that political liberals should distinguish between unreasonable citizens who are disposed to support de re publicly justifiable laws and policies and unreasonable citizens who support illegitimate laws and policies. Reasonable citizens may form political associations with the former group, but not the latter group.

Keywords: political liberalism; public reason; political associations; political liberties; political socialization; duty of civility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:pophec:v:24:y:2025:i:3:p:193-214

DOI: 10.1177/1470594X241269571

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