Representative Versus Direct Democracy: a Test of Allocative Efficiency in Local Government Expenditures

Steven Deller () and David L. Chicoine
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David L. Chicoine: University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Public Finance Review, 1993, vol. 21, issue 1, 100-114

Abstract: The influence of government structure on the efficient allocation of public resources is examined A test developed by Brueckner is used to examine differences in the allocative efficiency of representative versus direct democracy forms of local government. The empirical results suggest that the form of government has no influence on the level of allocative efficiency.

Date: 1993
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:21:y:1993:i:1:p:100-114

DOI: 10.1177/109114219302100105

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