Majority Rule versus Supermajority Rules: Their Effects on Narrow and Broad Taxes

Jac Heckelman and Keith L. Dougherty
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Keith L. Dougherty: University of Georgia, Athens, GA, USA

Public Finance Review, 2010, vol. 38, issue 6, 738-761

Abstract: Buchanan and Tullock argue that larger supermajority rules reduce tyranny of the majority but should have no effect on the passage of mutually advantageous policies. The authors test this argument by separately analyzing the effect of supermajority requirements on taxes that are targeted toward narrow groups (more redistributive) and taxes targeted toward a broader base (less redistributive), in a panel of fifty states from 1970 to 2008. Regression analysis reveals an inverse relationship between narrow taxes and the size of the majority rule requirement and no relationship between broad taxes and the size of the majority requirement—consistent with the claim of Buchanan and Tullock. The authors also find that Democratic controlled governments have significantly higher tax rates on narrow taxes than Republican controlled governments. The reverse is found for broad taxes, but the result is not as strong.

Keywords: taxation; majority rule; constitutional economics; redistribution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:38:y:2010:i:6:p:738-761

DOI: 10.1177/1091142110373608

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