Some Economic Implications of John Rawls' Theory of Justice

Samuel T. Phillips
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Samuel T. Phillips: Syracuse University

Public Finance Review, 1975, vol. 3, issue 1, 70-85

Abstract: The difference principle of John Rawls is viewed as a modest reconstitution of the Pareto test for maximization of total welfare. The author illustrates through use of utility analysis that the difference principle for redressing inequities requires the least redistribution of the several options available to persons in Rawls' initial position. Furthermore, the Rawlsian framework is placed in a broader notion of equity which calls into question whether Rawls' theory adequately addresses the problem of absolute as opposed to relative advantages to the least advantaged. Democratic institutions awaken and flatter the passion for equality without ever being able to satisfy it entirely. This complete equality is always slipping through the people's fingers at the moment when they think to grasp it, fleeing as Pascal says, in an eternal flight; the people grow heated in search of this blessing, all the more precious because it is near enough to be seen but too far off to be tasted.

Date: 1975
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:3:y:1975:i:1:p:70-85

DOI: 10.1177/109114217500300105

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