On the Usefulness of Game Theory for the Resolution of Real-World Collective Action Problems

Werner Raub, Thomas Voss and Jeroen Weesie
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Werner Raub: Utrecht University
Thomas Voss: University of Munich
Jeroen Weesie: Utrecht University

Rationality and Society, 1992, vol. 4, issue 1, 95-102

Abstract: An important task in the application of game-theoretic rational choice models to collective action problems consists in linking elements of the social structure to abstract concepts used in the modeling of game situations. Michael Hechter correctly identifies three major research areas in game theory (equilibrium selection, incomplete information, imperfect information) where such links are needed. However, we disagree with most of his conclusions on the problem situation in these areas.

Date: 1992
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:4:y:1992:i:1:p:95-102

DOI: 10.1177/1043463192004001011

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