THE NORMATIVE STRUCTURE OF SOLIDARITY AND INEQUALITY

Rolf Ziegler

Rationality and Society, 1997, vol. 9, issue 4, 449-467

Abstract: Needy people prefer receiving help in interpersonal relationships or being supported by a collective solidarity system. However, all actors would also prefer not to help or not to contribute. The dilemma is sharpened if there exists inequality of need or helping capacity among the actors. Using a dynamic selectionist model the evolutionary development of a pool of strategies is simulated for different scenarios with varying proportions of `poor' and `rich' people. A special strategy called `Hypocritical Cooperation', which deviates itself (if not threatened by sanctions) but acts to compel others to conform to solidarity norms, turns out to be very efficient and robust.

Keywords: inequality; rational choice; social norms; solidarity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:ratsoc:v:9:y:1997:i:4:p:449-467

DOI: 10.1177/104346397009004004

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