Internal Security Crises in Punjab, Kashmir and Jaffna: The Power of Moderation

Ali Ahmed

South Asian Survey, 2010, vol. 17, issue 2, 295-311

Abstract: The article argues that the militarised nature of India’s initial reaction to an internal security crisis contributes to deterioration in the situation. The resulting full-blown insurgency, usually complicated by proxy war, takes several years to wind down due to the political prong of strategy not keeping pace with the military prong. This is to the detriment of the legitimacy of the state and exacts a high human price. Learning lessons from India’s initial reaction to insurgency outbreak therefore helps to highlight the importance of prevention and possibilities in non-militarised alternatives. The article considers the initial phases of three of India’s major counter-insurgency engagements—Punjab, Kashmir and in Tamil areas of Sri Lanka—to arrive at the conclusion that moderation in facing crisis prevents conflict outbreak.

Keywords: India; counter-insurgency; internal security; Kashmir; Punjab; IPKF; Sri Lanka; Jaffna; Indian Army; Khalistan; LTTE; national security (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:soasur:v:17:y:2010:i:2:p:295-311

DOI: 10.1177/097152311201700207

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