 Revenue Sharing in Community–Private Sector Lodges in Namibia: A Bargaining ModelRenaud Lapeyre Tourism Economics, 2009, vol. 15, issue 3, 653-669 Abstract: Taking tourism in Namibian rural areas as an empirical case study, this paper analyses the main factors that explain the economic outcome in a negotiation process in which local communities and private operators bargain over the distribution of income generated through a partnership lodge. While much research has focused on the required preconditions (especially property rights) and efficiency effects of tourism partnerships, a Nash bargaining model allows us to assess the distributive effects of such contracts. In particular, variables such as insecure community land tenure, and the resulting reduced value of land, the remoteness of lodges and the community's impatience and attitude towards risk could explain why rural communities have not so far captured the lion's share from tourism activities in communal lands. Finally, the paper shows that future research will be needed to complete the model in order to provide an account of the contractual problems that limit the efficiency of tourism partnerships in rural areas – transaction costs and underinvestment. Keywords: Nash bargaining solution; property rights; common-pool resources; community–private sector partnerships; rural tourism; Namibia (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sae:toueco:v:15:y:2009:i:3:p:653-669 DOI: 10.5367/000000009789036585 Access Statistics for this article More articles in Tourism Economics |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.