Deficits, Coalition Effects and the Timing of Decisions

Gerald Pech

CRIEFF Discussion Papers from Centre for Research into Industry, Enterprise, Finance and the Firm

Abstract: This paper develops an intertemporal model of legislative bargaining in the presence of distorting redistributive instruments. It includes negotiations in the cabinet and in the parliament that acts with or without coalitional discipline. We focus on the comparison of outcomes with negotiations on a debt target prior to tax spending decisions to outcomes where the level of debt is renegotiated. In the cabinet, a switch to targeting procedures allows for local improvements in debt policies. In the parliament with lack of coalitional discipline targeting results in a materially balanced budget.

Keywords: Public debt; Budgeting; Non cooperative bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D78 H61 H62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-02
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