Franchising Passenger Rail Services

Antony Dnes

CRIEFF Discussion Papers from Centre for Research into Industry, Enterprise, Finance and the Firm

Abstract: In this discussion paper I examine the UK Government's proposals for franchising passenger rail services. I show that autioning profitable routes to the highest bidder tends to redistribute rather than enhance welfare. This is also true for auctioning loss-making routes to the lowest bidder in subsidies. I show that an alternative auction scheme, based on Chadwick's proposals, is superior.

JEL-codes: L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1992-10
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:san:crieff:9216

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