Robustness and feasibility of corporatism

Nicola Acocella () and Giovanni Di Bartolomeo ()

No 44, Working Papers in Public Economics from Department of Economics and Law, Sapienza University of Roma

Abstract: By considering a standard game between the Government and a centralised trade union, we investigate the robustness of the claim that corporatism has a positive effect on macroeconomic performance. We test this claim with respect to different kinds of non-co-operative equilibria, model parameterisations and union’s utility functions (different in both form and arguments). Furthermore, we introduce in the literature the issue of the feasibility of corporatism, i.e., whether and under what conditions it is in the interest of both agents to implement a corporatist approach to economic policies.

Keywords: employment; inflation; trade unions; Government; corporatism; policy game; feasibility. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E24 E31 E58 E61 J51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23
Date: 2001-07
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