ESTRUTURA ESTRATÉGICA DE UM SIMPLES MERCADO DE COMPRA E VENDA

Marilda Sotomayor ()

Brazilian Review of Econometrics, 1999, vol. 19, issue 2

Abstract: We consider the cooperative market game studied in Sotomayor (1999-a), where identical and indivisible items are to be sold by only one seller to potential buyers. Agents' preferences are described by a reservation value and all buyers can buy up to their quota of objects. The buying and selling mechanism is a sealed bid auction. Suhmitted bids determine an interval (...) from where a market-c1earing price can be selected. The price (...), where each choice of (...) and of a matching rule define a different mechanism. Each of these mechanisms induces a non-cooperative game whose strategic structure is then analysed. Under reasonable assumptions we show that these non-cooperative games can be regarded as a competitive process for achieving a cooperative outcome: every equilibrium payoff is a competitive equilibrium for the cooperative market game. Precise answers can be given to the strategic questions raised.

Date: 1999
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