EQUILIBRIUM EXCHANGE RATE POLICIES: COMPLICIT RENEGOTIATION-PROOF OUTCOMES

Pierre Mella-Barral and Paolo Vitale

No 181, Computing in Economics and Finance 2002 from Society for Computational Economics

Keywords: Exchange Rate Management (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 F31 F33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-07-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ifn
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Related works:
Working Paper: Equilibrium Exchange Rate Policies: Complicit Renegotiation-Proof Outcomes (2002)
Working Paper: Equilibrium Exchange Rate Policies: Complicit Renegotiation-Proof Outcomes (2001)
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