Independence of a Regulatory Institution - a Means to Alleviate Credibility Problems in the CEE Countries

Gábor Virág ()

No 34, CASE-CEU Working Papers from CASE-Center for Social and Economic Research

Abstract: In Hungary and the Central-European region, state regulation has been at the forefront of interest since the beginning of the economic transition. Among the many interesting questions raised, we would like to analyze the problem of building an appropriate regulatory system allowing the industry to operate efficiently from a social point of view. We use the term "regulatory system" for the description of decision rights. A particular regulatory system amounts to the allocation of decision rights between the different actors in a regulatory game (regulatory agency, government, courts, consumer organizations, competition office). We do not propose a specific incentive scheme, which must be enforced (and is enforceable), instead we concentrate on the possible enforcement mechanisms.

Keywords: credibility; Hungary (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 20 pages
Date: 1999
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://case-research.eu/upload/publikacja_plik/69748_CEU-CASE34.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sec:ceuwps:0034

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CASE-CEU Working Papers from CASE-Center for Social and Economic Research Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Marta Kowerko ().