Environmental Regulation with Optimal Monitoring and Enforcement

Hans W. Gottinger ()
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Hans W. Gottinger: University of Maastricht and CSEF, University of Salerno

CSEF Working Papers from Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy

Abstract: We derive a set of optimal environmental regulations in the presence of asymmetric information about pollution abatement costs, where compliance may have to be induced through appropriate monitoring and enforcement measures. The regulator commits to monitoring of compliance with incentive compatible environmental regulations. The regulator can reveal regulations to achieve the objective of choosing the given abatement level, by proposing a menu of regulatory contracts that specify abatement levels.

Keywords: Environmental Regulation; Asymmetric Information; Incentive Compatibility; Monitoring (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I18 L51 Q28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000-12-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-agr, nep-reg and nep-res
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sef:csefwp:49

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