On the Dark Side of Political Stability

Maria Rosa Battaggion, Steven Jeremy Ntambi and Salvatore Piccolo ()
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Steven Jeremy Ntambi: Università di Bergamo,

CSEF Working Papers from Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy

Abstract: We build a simple model highlighting the link between efficient procurement, stability, and competition. Specifically, we characterize the trade-off between political stability and economic efficiency that shapes governments’ procurement decisions in hostile or politically unstable environments.

Keywords: Competition; Efficiency; Political Stability; Procurement. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-05-27
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sef:csefwp:565

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