A Note on guilt aversion in the Battle of Sexes game

Giuseppe De Marco (), Maria Romaniello () and Alba Roviello ()
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Giuseppe De Marco: University of Naples Parthenope and CSEF, https://csef.it/people/giuseppe-de-marco/
Maria Romaniello: Università degli Studi della Campania Luigi Vanvitelli.
Alba Roviello: University of Napoli Federico II, https://www.csef.it

CSEF Working Papers from Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy

Abstract: We analyze the effects of guilt aversion in the Battle of Sexes game by exploiting the theory of psychological games and the concept of psychological Nash equilibrium. Then we examine the impact of ambiguity in the (second-order) beliefs by taking into account the theory of psychological games under ambiguity. Our results show that the sensitivity to guilt affects some equilibrium of the game since a player might be willing to accept a lower expected utility to compensate the otherÕs disutility from guilt. Ambiguity, in turn, makes this effect more evident as it makes it greater the disutility from guilt.

Keywords: Battle of sexes; guilt aversion; psychological games; maxmin preferences. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-12-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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