On Guilt Aversion in Symmetric 2×2 Anti-Coordination Games

Giuseppe De Marco (), Maria Romaniello and Alba Roviello ()
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Giuseppe De Marco: University of Napoli Parthenope and CSEF and Università degli Studi di Napoli Federico II, https://csef.it/people/giuseppe-de-marco/
Maria Romaniello: University of Campania Luigi Vanvitelli., https://www.unicampania.it/
Alba Roviello: Department of Economics and Statistics, University of Napoli Federico II., https://www.docenti.unina.it/alba.roviello

CSEF Working Papers from Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy

Abstract: This paper examines how guilt aversion affects the equilibria of symmetric 2×2 games with the same Nash equilibrium structure as the Hawk–Dove game: two asymmetric strict pure equilibria and one completely mixed-strategy equilibrium. We classify these generalized Hawk–Dove games into two subclasses, Type 1 and Type 2, based on players’ preferences over deviations toward symmetric profiles. We characterize best-reply correspondences and equilibria under guilt aversion, showing that outcomes are highly sensitive to guilt parameters. In Type 1 games, when guilt sensitivity exceeds a threshold, a new symmetric equilibrium emerges while the mixed-strategy equilibrium disappears. In Type 2 games, guilt aversion affects only the mixed equilibrium, leaving the two asymmetric equilibria unchanged.

Keywords: Hawk-Dove games; equilibria; guilt aversion; psychological games; ambiguous beliefs. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-01-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-upt
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