Persuading an Inattentive and Privately Informed Receiver

Pietro Dall’Ara ()
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Pietro Dall’Ara: University of Naples Federico II and CSEF, https://csef.it/people/pietro-dallara/

CSEF Working Papers from Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy

Abstract: This paper studies the persuasion of a receiver who accesses information only if she exerts costly attention effort. A sender designs an experiment to persuade the receiver to take a specific action. The experiment affects the receiver’s attention effort, that is, the probability that she updates her beliefs. As an implication, persuasion has two margins: extensive (effort) and intensive (action). The receiver’s utility exhibits a supermodularity property in information and effort. By leveraging this property, we establish a general equivalence between experiments and persuasion mechanisms à la Kolotilin et al. (2017). In applications, the sender’s optimal strategy involves censoring favorable states.

Keywords: persuasion, inattention, information acquisition; information design. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D83 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025-10-27
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-mac, nep-mic and nep-upt
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sef:csefwp:766

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