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Public Sector Salary Caps and the Careers of Public Managers

Edoardo Di Porto (), Christian Dustmann (), Chiara Giannetto () and Lorenzo Incoronato ()
Additional contact information
Christian Dustmann: UCL and RFBerlin
Chiara Giannetto: UCL and RFBerlin

CSEF Working Papers from Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy

Abstract: This paper examines how salary caps affect retention and selection of managerial talent in the public sector. We exploit a 2014 reform in Italy that capped top public-sector salaries. Managers affected were about 5 percentage points more likely to move to the private sector. Exit propensity was especially high among executives of state-owned companies, while managers in traditional public administration largely remained in public employment despite substantial pay cuts. Exiting managers were positively selected, reducing average managerial quality in state-owned companies by about 2 percent. The reform generated modest fiscal savings of around 0.1 percent of public-sector labor costs.

Keywords: salary caps; public managers; public-private mobility; state-owned companies. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026-09-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lma
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