The Appointment of the Commission and its Role in the Legislative Process in the European Union

C. Crombez

Review of Business and Economic Literature, 2010, vol. 55, issue 2, 156-175

Abstract: This paper studies the role of the Commission in the European Union (EU) and how it has been affected by treaty reforms. I present a game-theoretical analysis of the Commission appointment and legislative processes, and apply it to the appointment of recent Commissions and their legislative programs. The reforms have led to more Parliamentary involvement and majority voting in the Council in both processes. I find that the introduction of majority voting in the legislative process in the mid-80s let the Commission move policy farther away from the status quo. Yet, the choice of a Commission still allowed the member states to commit to a legislative program that was preferred by all of them. More recently the fact that the Parliament can amend Commission proposals together with the Council, and the move toward majority voting in the Commission appointment process, have created a majoritarian political system. The appointments of recent Commissions suggest, however, that member states are reluctant to move toward such a system at this point.

Date: 2010
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sen:rebelj:v:55:i:2:y:2010:p:156-175

Access Statistics for this article

Review of Business and Economic Literature is currently edited by Hans Kluwer

More articles in Review of Business and Economic Literature from Intersentia
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Petra Van den Bempt ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).