A General Coalition Structure: Some Equivalence Results

Giovanna Bimonte ()
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Giovanna Bimonte: Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Statistiche, Università degli Studi di Salerno

No 3_230, Working Papers from Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Statistiche, Università degli Studi di Salerno

Abstract: TThe formation of coalition may imply some theoretical difficulties, such as costs arising from forming a coalition or sharing information among agents. In this paper we will assume that only a subset S of the set of all possible coalitions in an economy is the set of admissible coalitions. We define the S-core concept, as in Hervs-Moreno. We will extend to a model with both uncertainty and asymmetric informations the results showed in Okuda and Shitovitz.

Keywords: Differential information economy; restriction on coalition formation; private core. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D11 D51 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-12
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Published in Working Papers, July 2014, pages 1-12

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http://www.dises.unisa.it/RePEc/sep/wpaper/3_230.pdf First version, 2013 (application/pdf)

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