Regulation and Control of Hazardous Wastes

Hans W. Gottinger

Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), 1994, vol. 130, issue I, 63-88

Abstract: Hazardous waste regulations require disposal in approved dumpsites, where environmental consequences are minimal but entry may be privately very costly. Imperfect policing of regulations makes the socially more costly option illicit disposal preferable form the perspective of the private decision maker. The existence of the waste disposal decision, its economic nature, production independence, and the control over environmental damage are key issues in the economics of hazardous waste management. This paper models a profit maximising, hazardous waste generating, monopolistic firm, a welfare maximizing regulatory agency, and investigates their behaviourial interactions.

Date: 1994
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