Trip your rival up and win the election? The influence of inter- and intra-party competition on allocation of discretionary investment grants in Poland

Łukasz Wiktor Olejnik and Marcin Grygo

No 2024-104, KAE Working Papers from Warsaw School of Economics, Collegium of Economic Analysis

Abstract: To date, there have been dozens of publications confirming the existence of alignment bias or hometown bias in the allocation of intergovernmental grants. However, the assumption is typically made that members of one party support one another in principle. Meanwhile, in proportional systems, candidates from one party compete with one another for a seat in parliament, which may affect the distribution of grants. This paper analyses the distribution of investment grants to local governments from the Polish Covid-19 Response Fund in 2021-2023. It presents results suggesting that if the distribution of discretionary investment grants is controlled by the members of a single party faction, local governments with ties to the hometowns or birth towns of members of parliament (MPs) representing that faction receive significantly more funding than other local governments. The hometowns or birth towns of opposition members receive significantly lower grants, while the hometowns or birth towns of politicians from the opposite faction of the ruling party receive the lowest grants. This supports the hypothesis that intra-party rivalry and the desire to reduce the re-election chances of rivals can have a powerful impact on the distribution of discretionary grants.

Keywords: alignment bias; hometown bias; core vs. swing voters hypothesis; intra-party competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H72 H73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2024-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-pol and nep-tra
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sgh:kaewps:2024104

DOI: 10.33119/kaewps2024104

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