Interim Correlated Rationalizability in Large Games

Łukasz Balbus, Michael Greinecker, Kevin Reffett and Łukasz Woźny

No 2025-113, KAE Working Papers from Warsaw School of Economics, Collegium of Economic Analysis

Abstract: We provide general theoretical foundations for modeling strategic uncertainty in large distributional Bayesian games with general type spaces, using a version of interim correlated rationalizability. We then focus on the case in which payoff functions are supermodular in actions, as is common in the literature on global games. This structure allows us to identify extremal interim correlated rationalizable solutions with extremal interim Bayes-Nash equilibria. Notably, no order structure on types is assumed. We illustrate our framework and results using the large versions of the electronic mail game and a global game.

Keywords: large games; interim correlated rationalizability; global games; electronic mail game; universal type space; supermodular games; Bayes-Nash equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2025-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sgh:kaewps:2025113

DOI: 10.33119/kaewps2025113

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