Inductive Game Theory: A Basic Scenario

Mamoru Kaneko () and Jeffrey Kline

No 06-A001, IEAS Working Paper : academic research from Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan

Abstract: The aim of this paper is to present the new theory called “inductive game theory”. A paper, published by one of the present authors with A. Matsui, discussed some part of inductive game theory in a specific game. Here, we will give a more developed discourse of the theory. The paper is written to show one entire picture of the theory: From individual raw experiences, short-term memories to long-term memories, inductive derivation of individual views, classification of such views, decision making or modification of behavior based on a view, and repercussion from the modified play in the objective game. We focus on some clear-cut cases, forgetting a lot of possible variants, but will still give a lot of results. In order to show one possible discourse as a whole, we will ask the question of how Nash equilibrium is emerging from the viewpoint of inductive game theory, and will give one answer.

Pages: 57 pages
Date: 2006-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Inductive game theory: A basic scenario (2008)
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