The Effect of Access Regulation on Broadbnd Deployment

Amitay Alter ()
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Amitay Alter: Stanford University

No 06-017, Discussion Papers from Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: This paper quetions whether or not mandatory unbundling delayed DSL deployment by BellSouth. By exploiting a law change in Kentucky and variation in access prices across markets, I find that deregulation in Kentucky triggered deployment, but no evidence that access prices affected deployment pace. An upper bound on the welfare loss due to late deployment in rural markets is $21 million. The findings are consistent with a positive effect of deregulation on the profitability of upgrades, but can also result from a strategic delay which is part of the bargaining between the firm and the regulator.

Keywords: Access regulation; Broadband; Hazard model; Technology adoption (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L42 L43 L51 L96 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-12
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:sip:dpaper:06-017

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