Stiff Competition: Vertical Relationships in Cremation Services

Lori Parcel ()
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Lori Parcel: Department of Economics, Stanford University

No 07-041, Discussion Papers from Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: I examine the relationship between retail market competition and wholesale contracting patterns, by analyzing subcontracting behavior of funeral homes (retailers) and crematories (wholesalers) in the Minnesota funeral industry. Exploiting detailed data on wholesale and retail quantities, subcontracting patterns, consumer and establishment locations, and retail pricing, I estimate a model that predicts pricing, consumer funeral home choice, and vertical relationships between funeral homes and crematories. I find that funeral homes seeking wholesale cremation services are significantly less likely to subcontract with crematories belonging to firms that are direct retail market competitors. The estimated aversion to subcontracting with competitors is greater for funeral homes with fewer proximate crematories. This is consistent with foreclosure by integrated crematories. Counterfactual analysis indicates that funeral homes with few crematories nearby (that are owned by retail competitors) bear additional costs ranging from $161 to $203 per body on average, or seven to nine percent of the retail price. Half of this cost impact is transmitted to consumers, resulting in a four percent retail price increase in these markets on average.

Keywords: Vertical integration; competitive market; retail market; wholsesale market (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D22 D40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-03
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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