About some methods of increasing revenue in the classical auctions

D. Khvalynskiy ()

Journal of Modern Competition, 2015, vol. 9, issue 3, 67-81

Abstract: The paper presents the conditions of revenue increasing of four standard auctions: English auction, second price sealed bid auction (Vickrey auction), first price sealed bid auction and Dutch auction. Moreover, we studied a number of special models of multi-object auctions developed by foreign researchers for sale of multiple objects: Uniform-Price Auction, Pay-Your-Bid Auction, Multi-Unit Vickrey Auction, Hierarchical Package Bidding Auction, Vickrey-Clarke-Groves, Simultaneous Ascending Auction, Ausubel Auction, Ausubel, Cramton, and Milgrom’s clock-proxy auction, product-mix auction.According to the analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of existing models of standard and multi-object auctions the author have developed and proposed a new model of auction, which is a symbiosis of the English auction and the Vickrey auction. It defines the contract price on the basis of competitors` bids and provides a higher expected revenue to the auctioneer. The advantages of the proposed model` revenue compared to a standard auction models.The developed model of the auction may find successful application in the formation of auction rules in realization of the Federal law of July 18, 2011 № 223-FZ «On procurement of goods, works, services by separate types of legal entities», as well as in finalizing the legislator’s competitive procurement rules in the Federal law of April 5, 2013 № 44-FZ «On contract system in procurement of goods, works, services for state and municipal needs».

Keywords: auction; optimal auction; profitability; efficiency; government procurement; the equivalence theory of income; contract; the mechanism of identification; design of economic mechanisms; Law No. 223-FZ; law No. 44-FZ (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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