Type I and type II errors in vertical restraints regulation

N. Dzagurova

Journal of Modern Competition, 2013, issue 6, 33-47

Abstract: The paper studies the specific features of trade-off between type I and type II errors in vertical restraints regulation. It pays attention to possible deviations from trade-off logic due to separate consideration of enforcement errors and some imperfections of Russian legal rules. The game-theoretic model which is discussed in the second part of the article can be useful for formal analysis of externalities created by the enforcement errors.

Keywords: type I and type II errors; vertical restraints; antitrust enforcement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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