Inefficient Equilibrium Traps and Mitigation Strategies in University-Industry Collaborative Talent Development: A Perspective of Incomplete Information Games

Yan Li, Jian Cui (), Shiyu Wang, Pengxia Yin and Na Yu
Additional contact information
Yan Li: Bortala Vocational and Technical College
Jian Cui: Bortala Vocational and Technical College
Shiyu Wang: Bortala Vocational and Technical College
Pengxia Yin: Bortala Vocational and Technical College
Na Yu: Wuhan Institute of Shipbuilding Technology

A chapter in Proceedings of the 2026 3rd International Conference on Applied Economics, Management Science and Social Development (AEMSS 2026), 2026, pp 601-608 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Despite longstanding policy advocacy for school-enterprise collaboration as a cornerstone of vocational education, a persistent “low-level equilibrium” trap hinders effective talent cultivation in underdeveloped regions such as Xinjiang. This interaction results in a supply-demand mismatch, evidenced by local data showing that fewer than 20% of participating firms articulate clear competency standards with hiring promises, and employer satisfaction with graduates stands at only 87% despite a high major-related employment rate. The study conceptualizes this impasse as an outcome of incomplete information dynamic games, where both parties rationally choose suboptimal strategies based on asymmetric information and unverifiable commitments. By constructing a game-theoretic model, the paper aims to systematically analyze the formation conditions and evolutionary path of this inefficient equilibrium.

Keywords: Incomplete Information Games; Low-Level Equilibrium Trap; School-Enterprise Cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:advbcp:978-94-6239-672-2_58

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9789462396722

DOI: 10.2991/978-94-6239-672-2_58

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Advances in Economics, Business and Management Research from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().