Shareholder Relationship Networks and Investment Efficiency

Wenhao Wang ()
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Wenhao Wang: Jinan University

A chapter in Proceedings of the 2026 4th International Conference on Digital Economy and Management Science (CDEMS 2026), 2026, pp 97-102 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This paper examines how shareholder relationship networks affect corporate investment efficiency in emerging markets. Based on from 2009 to 2023, we construct shareholder networks using common ownership ties among the top ten shareholders, and employ betweenness centrality to capture firms’ network positions. Empirical results show that a firm’s network centrality significantly improves its investment efficiency. Firms with higher centrality suffer from fewer over-investment and under-investment problems. The results indicates that the coefficient of network centrality on investment inefficiency is negative. In China’s market, the governance role of shareholder networks—including better information sharing and stronger external monitoring—dominates the risk of collusive behavior.

Keywords: Shareholder Relationship Network; Investment Efficiency; Corporate Governance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:advbcp:978-94-6239-699-9_12

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DOI: 10.2991/978-94-6239-699-9_12

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