Research on Low-Carbon Supply Chain Decision-Making Considering Low-Carbon Reputation Under Different Power Structures
Xiaoxiong Huang () and
Shimin Zhou
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Xiaoxiong Huang: Shanghai Maritime University, Institute of Logistics Science and Engineering
Shimin Zhou: Shanghai Maritime University, Institute of Logistics Science and Engineering
A chapter in Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Economic Development and Business Culture (ICEDBC 2023), 2024, pp 566-578 from Springer
Abstract:
Abstract This study considers a two-echelon low-carbon supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer under different power structures. In response to consumers’ preferences for low-carbon products, the manufacturer invests in emissions reduction, while the retailer engages in low-carbon marketing to build a low-carbon reputation in the supply chain. Three game models are developed to examine the effects of cost coefficients on investment levels, marketing levels, and profits under different power structures in consideration of the manufacturer and the retailer’s bargaining power. Our findings reveal that the VN power structure is most effective in encouraging both the manufacturer and the retailer to invest in emissions reduction and low-carbon marketing when the cost coefficients are high. When one cost coefficient is high and the other one is low, the emissions reduction investments level and low-carbon marketing level are the highest under the MS or RS power structures. Additionally, when either the emissions reduction investment level or low-carbon marketing level is relatively high, supply chain members earn maximum profits under their dominant power structure. However, when both levels are relatively low, profits are lowest under the VN power structure. These findings offer important management guidance for different supply chain enterprises seeking to build a low-carbon reputation in different circumstances.
Keywords: low-carbon reputation; emissions reduction; low-carbon marketing; different power structures; game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:advbcp:978-94-6463-246-0_69
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DOI: 10.2991/978-94-6463-246-0_69
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