Coordination and Cooperation in Dyadic Relationships
G. Lawrence Zahn () and
Gerrit Wolf ()
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G. Lawrence Zahn: University of California, Riverside
Gerrit Wolf: State University of New York
Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, 1998, vol. 3, issue 4, No 2, 249-265
Abstract:
Abstract A Markov model with a coordination parameter isdeveloped to depict coordination and cooperation decisionprocesses in 2 × 2 game relationships. The parameters ofthe model can be used to define and measure various forms ofinfluence. The model is applied to data collected using aprisoner's dilemma payoff structure to represent thesuperior-subordinate relationship. The results demonstrate theusefulness of the model and the measures of influence. Superiorsand subordinates are more likely to coordinate following mutualcooperation, achieving matching behaviors more frequently thanan independent-decisions model would predict. Subordinates showslightly more influence over leaders' behaviors than vice versa.
Keywords: cooperation; coordination; prisoners dilemma; superior-subordinate exchange (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998
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DOI: 10.1023/A:1009605527435
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