Economic Models: Gods, Supplicants, and Priests

Mario Ferrero

Chapter Chapter 8 in The Political Economy of Indo-European Polytheism, 2022, pp 141-168 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This chapter provides four formal models to match the previous economic analysis. First, a model of divine preferences constructed as a sequence of Edgeworth boxesEdgeworth box, which illustrates the supplicant’s dilemmaSupplicant’s dilemma and the theological escapes from it. Second, a model of a Prisoner’s DilemmaPrisoner’s Dilemma game among priests, illustrating the incentive to defect from cooperation and the ways to overcome it. Third, a model of an Assurance gameAssurance game between gods and priests which has two institutional equilibria, a risk-dominantEquilibriumrisk-dominant (Greco-Roman) equilibrium and a payoff-dominantEquilibriumpayoff-dominant (Hindu and Zoroastrian) equilibrium. Fourth, a model of the missionary expansion of a cooperative religious organization that protects the old members’ benefits as a condition for the expansion to be acceptable, illustrating the Hindu and Zoroastrian expansions.

Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-97943-0_8

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