 Market Structure and DumpingMarcel Marion Chapter Chapter 8 in International Trade Policy and European Industry, 2014, pp 141-171 from Springer Abstract: Abstract Differences between markets result in dumping. Two models are opposed in order to explain dumping from a cooperative oligopoly into a market of competitive oligopoly, the Bertrand versus Cournot model: price maintenance on one hand and volume of production increase on the other. Definitions of dumping in economic literature appear insufficient. Dumping appears an extremely rational phenomenon, resulting from market circumstances, in which producers have an often-disregarded active and influential role. It appears that dumping can add to profitability. It is also demonstrated that dumping is, in principle, predatory. The business case of Tosoh shows how a Japanese producer takes a high domestic price and a low export price as given fact. Feasibility calculations for a joint venture project have been based on assumption of completely different prices: a proposal for a joint venture with apparent objective of eliminating the Western competitor by offer of Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEM) supply of dumped magneto optical discs and by using the Westerner’s technology. Keywords: Marginal Cost; Domestic Market; Average Cost; Export Market; Price Discrimination (search for similar items in EconPapers) There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:conchp:978-3-319-00392-4_8 Ordering information: This item can be ordered from DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-00392-4_8 Access Statistics for this chapter More chapters in Contributions to Economics from Springer |
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