Concluding Remarks

Joseph Plasmans, Jacob Engwerda, Bas van Aarle, Giovanni Di Bartolomeo () and Tomasz Michalak
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Joseph Plasmans: University of Antwerp, Belgium and Tilburg University
Tomasz Michalak: University of Antwerp

A chapter in Dynamic Modeling of Monetary and Fiscal Cooperation Among Nations, 2006, pp 303-307 from Springer

Abstract: International macroeconomic policy coordination is an important, but complex topic. The practice of international policy coordination has not been without disappointments, fuelling the arguments of sceptics to propagate a laissez-faire approach instead. A laissez-faire approach, however, ignores that in an increasingly integrated and global world economy, there are significant positive and negative externalities. Economic externalities create the scope and scale for coordinated policies in order to outperform upon a setting with non-cooperative policies. Or putting it in a more negative manner: in case of non-cooperative policies, policymakers -purposely or not- impose with their policies externalities upon each other, since their individual policy decisions do not take account of the consequences for other policymakers. In other words a non-cooperative setting is unlikely to deliver optimal outcomes.

Date: 2006
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DOI: 10.1007/0-387-27931-8_9

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