Dynamic Analysis of an Electoral Campaign

Luca Lambertini ()

A chapter in Dynamic Games in Economics, 2014, pp 187-204 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This chapter proposes a differential game describing electoral campaigns where two candidates invest so as to increase the number of their respective voters. It is shown that parties overinvest as compared to the social optimum, while the total number of votes may be larger or lower than the first best one, depending on the level of negative externalities affecting the campaign. The model is also extended to allow for n candidates, so as to derive the socially optimal number of candidates. It appears that the number of candidates maximising the total number of votes on the election day is lower than the number of candidates entering the political game attracted by any non-negative share of consensus.

Keywords: Differential Game; Social Optimum; Electoral Campaign; Social Planning; Terminal Date (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Working Paper: Dynamic Analysis of an Electoral Campaign (2001)
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-54248-0_9

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