Opinion Dynamics Control in a Social Network with a Communication Structure

Hui Jiang (), Vladimir V. Mazalov (), Hongwei Gao () and Chen Wang ()
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Hui Jiang: Qingdao University
Vladimir V. Mazalov: Russian Academy of Sciences
Hongwei Gao: Qingdao University
Chen Wang: Qingdao University

Dynamic Games and Applications, 2023, vol. 13, issue 1, No 15, 412-434

Abstract: Abstract This paper considers a game-theoretic model of external control influence on opinion dynamics and reached consensus in a social network. The network participants are linked through an arbitrary communication graph. The goal of control is to keep the opinions of all network participants in the neighborhood of a given value. If there are several players, these target values may differ. The dynamic game under consideration belongs to the class of linear-quadratic games in discrete time. Optimal control and equilibrium are calculated using the Bellman equation. In the symmetric case, the solution is constructed analytically. Some numerical simulations illustrate the influence of the communication structure of a social network on the opinion dynamics and reached consensus.

Keywords: Opinion dynamics; Social network; Influence matrix; Communication structure; Linear-quadratic game; Optimal control; Nash equilibrium; Bellman equation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1007/s13235-021-00406-y

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