An Optimal Group Decision-Making Approach for Cyber Security Using Improved Selection-Drift Dynamics

Enning Zhang, Gang Wang (), Runnian Ma and Juan Li
Additional contact information
Enning Zhang: Air Force Engineering University
Gang Wang: Air Force Engineering University
Runnian Ma: Air Force Engineering University
Juan Li: Air Force Engineering University

Dynamic Games and Applications, 2023, vol. 13, issue 3, No 12, 980-1004

Abstract: Abstract In cyber security, balancing investment and risk has always been a dilemmatic problem since the threats often lurk in the shadows. Thus, timely and scientifically credible decision-making will have great significance in such an attack-defense game of incomplete information. To this end, an evolutionary game model of group decision-making is proposed to analyze the behavioral change process of the defender population. In particular, we first introduce the concept of observation error and short-term prediction in network communication and establish an improved selection–drift dynamics in which errors are automatically corrected to a certain extent and the convergence speed is faster than the prototype. By calculating the stable evolutionary equilibrium of the defender population, the optimal group decision-making approach is formulated. Case studies on big data vulnerabilities indicate that the proposed model and approach perform better in robustness and computational efficiency than the 3 typical models under jamming environments.

Keywords: Cybersecurity; Decision-making; Evolutionary game theory; Optimal defense strategy; Improved selection–drift dynamics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s13235-022-00476-6 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:dyngam:v:13:y:2023:i:3:d:10.1007_s13235-022-00476-6

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/13235

DOI: 10.1007/s13235-022-00476-6

Access Statistics for this article

Dynamic Games and Applications is currently edited by Georges Zaccour

More articles in Dynamic Games and Applications from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().