Pure Pursuit with an Effector

Alexander Moll (), Meir Pachter () and Zachariah Fuchs ()
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Alexander Moll: Air Force Research Laboratory, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base
Meir Pachter: Air Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base
Zachariah Fuchs: University of Cincinnati

Dynamic Games and Applications, 2023, vol. 13, issue 3, No 11, 979 pages

Abstract: Abstract The study of pursuit curves is valuable in the context of air-to-air combat as pure pursuit guidance (heading directly at the target) is oftentimes implemented. The problems considered in this paper concern a Pursuer, implementing pure pursuit (i.e., line of sight guidance), chasing an Evader who holds course. Previous results are applicable to the case in which capture is defined as the two agents being coincident, i.e., point capture. The focus here is on obtaining results for the more realistic case where the pursuer is endowed with an effector whose range is finite. The scenario in which the Evader begins inside the Pursuer’s effector range is also considered (i.e., escape from persistent surveillance, among other potential applications). Questions herein addressed include: does the engagement end in head-on collision or tail chase, will the Evader be captured or escape, what is the minimum distance the Pursuer will attain, for two Pursuers, is simultaneous capture/escape optimal and, if so, what is the optimal heading for the Evader (max time to capture, or min time to escape), and the feasibility for a fast Evader to escape from many Pursuers. Where possible, closed-form, analytic results are obtained, otherwise attention is given to computability with an eye towards real-time, on-board implementation.

Keywords: Pursuit–evasion; Pure pursuit; Persistent surveillance; Finite capture radius (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1007/s13235-022-00481-9

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