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Replicator Dynamics for Stochastic Games

Divya Murali (), K. S. Mallikarjuna Rao () and A. J. Shaiju ()
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Divya Murali: Indian Institute of Technology Bombay
K. S. Mallikarjuna Rao: Indian Institute of Technology Bombay
A. J. Shaiju: Indian Institute of Technology Madras

Dynamic Games and Applications, 2025, vol. 15, issue 4, No 7, 1252-1274

Abstract: Abstract Stochastic games constitute an important class of sequential decision making problems where multiple agents interact in a stochastic environment with competing objectives. In this paper, we develop evolutionary theory for stochastic games (in the lines of evolutionary game theory) and develop the notion of evolutionarily stable strategies which was initiated by Flesch et al. [10]. Our main contribution is introducing the appropriate replicator dynamics corresponding to the stochastic game and the study of the dynamic stability of evolutionarily stable strategies with respect to the replicator dynamics.

Keywords: Stochastic Games; Evolutionarily Stable Strategy; Replicator Dynamics; Dynamic Stability; 91A15; 91A22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/s13235-025-00651-5

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