Cooperative Mechanisms among Stakeholders in Government Data Openness: A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis

Jia Fu, Yuanyuan Huang () and Dewei Wang
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Jia Fu: Chongqing University of Posts and Telecommunications
Yuanyuan Huang: Chongqing University of Posts and Telecommunications
Dewei Wang: Chongqing University of Posts and Telecommunications

Dynamic Games and Applications, 2025, vol. 15, issue 5, No 4, 1587-1616

Abstract: Abstract Conflicts of interest among stakeholders in government data openness significantly impact the development and utilization of government data, necessitating establishing targeted collaborative mechanisms. This study, leveraging the perspective of a multi-stakeholder value co-creation network, constructs a tripartite game model to deeply analyze the dynamic interactions and evolutionary stability among local governments, data developers, and consumers. MATLAB simulations are employed to explore the effects of key parameters on system evolution. The results indicate that the initial strengths of intentions among the three parties substantially influence the final stable equilibrium state, with interactions occurring among their respective strategies. To establish a sustainable collaboration mechanism, local governments should construct a fair benefit distribution system to incentivize the opening of raw data effectively; data developers should enhance their data risk management capabilities to ensure data security; and active supervision by consumers effectively supports the enthusiasm for government data openness.

Keywords: Government data openness; Stakeholders; Collaborative mechanism; Evolutionary game; Value co-creation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/s13235-024-00615-1

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