Ideas for a Cognitive Approach to Political Behavior

Massimo Egidi ()
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Massimo Egidi: Luiss University

A chapter in Schumpeterian Legacy in Modern Times, 2026, pp 487-505 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This article proposes a cognitive interpretation of political behavior, suitable to describe collective processes that lead to the evolution of democratic institutions. The paper posits that aversion to violations of social norms (cheating aversion) reflects a culturally and cognitively rooted mechanism that is essential for preserving institutional trust and cooperation; by prioritizing respect for norms over immediate self-interest, cheating aversion leads citizens to support the cooperative frameworks necessary for social stability. Drawing on Schumpeter’s theory of democracy, the analysis suggests that a fragility of democratic rules emerges when short-term selfishness prevails over loyalty in political competition. When this threshold is crossed, the erosion of norm-guided behavior undermines the very foundations of trust and institutional legitimacy.

Date: 2026
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:eccchp:978-3-032-26294-3_25

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-032-26294-3_25

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