An experimental examination of credible information disclosure, perception of fairness, and intention to do business in online multi-bilateral negotiations

Bo Yu (), Gregory E. Kersten and Rustam Vahidov
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Bo Yu: Dalhousie University
Gregory E. Kersten: Concordia University
Rustam Vahidov: Concordia University

Electronic Markets, 2022, vol. 32, issue 1, No 14, 217-237

Abstract: Abstract Inter-firm negotiations are often non-discrete: they are not isolated exchange episodes, but part of an ongoing process of building strategic relationships between the firms. This view posits a challenge to the design and application of negotiation mechanisms in e-markets supporting business-to-business exchanges. The assessment of the mechanisms needs to include both the impacts within each discrete exchange episode and those shaping the future of the inter-firm relationships. We argue that strategies of information revelation implemented with negotiation mechanisms can influence participants’ fairness perceptions, which can further affect business relationships. The paper examines both substantive and subjective measures in an experiment involving two multi-bilateral negotiations with distinct information disclosure strategies. The results show that the revelation of the best offer affects participants’ perceived fairness which, in turn, positively influences intention to do business. The findings have implications for both the design and use of negotiation mechanisms where inter-firm relationships are concerned.

Keywords: perceived fairness; multi-bilateral negotiations; business relationship (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D47 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s12525-021-00473-4

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