Public choice in times of declining democracy

Bruno Frey and Andre Briviba ()
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Andre Briviba: CREMA–Center for Research in Economics, Management, and the Arts

Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, 2025, vol. 42, issue 2, No 5, 458 pages

Abstract: Abstract A marked decline of democratic institutions and states, as well as the number of people living in such countries, has been observed over the recent years. Venezuela, Turkey, and even the US, are examples of this trend. Strikingly, we argue, that also the importance of Public Choice, analysing the interplay of incentives, institutions, and politics has decreased, although immensely important for the study of democracy and politics. While the decline in democracy is well documented, the same is not true for the decline of Public Choice. This paper empirically presents the development over time of Public Choice (and related approaches such as Political Economics or Constitutional Economics) using several different measurement approaches. Scholarly attention to Public Choice increased strongly from the seventies to the beginning of the 21st century and, since then, markedly decreased. Several possible reasons for the decline are discussed, such as a sense of exhaustion with a particular approach or a new zeitgeist. Several possibilities to overcome the paradoxical situation of an area in need of analysis and the fall of a respective analytical approach, Public Choice, are proposed.

Keywords: Public choice; Constitutional economics; Political economics; Political economy; Political science; Economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B41 B52 H80 N01 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/s40888-025-00366-1

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